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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to assess critically
the development of United States tactical nuclear
weapons (TNW) doctrine, from its inception during the
Eisenhov/er years to its current status in the Carter
Administration.
By viewing the evolution of tactical nuclear
doctrine over the span of some thirty plus years,
it was hoped that a better understanding of how
American policy makers have related nuclear power to
diplomacy could be achieved.
It is suggested that U.S. TNW doctrine has
developed within the framework of deterrence in American
strategic thought, The development of the doctrine has
been primarily defensive in nature, measured to enhance
the deterrent effect of U.S. theatre forces against
Soviet inspired aggression.
Tactical nuclear doctrine as having deterrent value
only is viewed as dangerously de-stabilising for United
States nuclear weapons strategy, because an examination
of Soviet literature and TNW capability indicates a
tactical nuclear doctrine of first-use in theatre
conflict. The disparity in US-USSR TNW doctrines results
in an imbalance of force in Russo-American theatre
scenarios. In conclusion, the recognition of tactical
nuclear weapons as contemporary weapons of war and the
integration of their use in U.S. military tactics and
strategy are recommended.

\
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UNITED STATES TACTICAL NUCLEAR
DOCTRINE: DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY

Perhaps the basic problem of strategy
in the nuclear age is how to establish
a relationship between a policy of
deterrence and a strategy for fighting
a war in case deterrence fails.1

For more than thirty years, since the bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American strategists have
struggled with the problem of military flexibility
within the context of the ultimate deterrent; thermo
nuclear war. Policy makers have attempted to develop
a formula which would utilize the power of nuclear wea
pons in the art of diplomacy, hoping that some secret
combination of atomic capability, national will, and
circumstance would provide enhanced leverage in inter
national politics. As history records, however, those
efforts have failed. Instead of expediting foreign
policy on behalf of those nations with atomic capabili
nuclear weapons have complicated their foreign policie
Conflicts which arise between nuclear powers can not
i
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957)* P« 132.

have merely localized repercussions; the denouement
of nuclear exchange would be disastrous for the world. Furthermore, the nature of war itself has been
transformed. The notion of winning seems obsolete
when measured against the losses which would be incurred
in a nuclear exchange. Indeed, the advent of nuclear
weapons has, if anything, presented statesmen not with
options of flexibility in the execution of national
goals, but with the inflexibilities inherent in
contemplating the unacceptability of nuclear war.
The history of the United States* strategic
nuclear doctrine has been one of searching fcr an
effective relationship between nuclear weapons and
foreign policy, particularly with regard to its postWorld War II adversary and nuclear counterpart, the
Soviet Union. Since 19^9» when the Soviets detonated
their first atomic warhead, the Soviet Union has been
perceived by American strategists as the most significant
threat to the United States in the tv/entieth century.
Consequently, policy makers have been concerned with
the task of deterring a costly nuclear exchange between
the two ideologically different powers. Furthermore,
given the rise of the Soviet Union as a pre-eminent

world power competing with the United States, an
additional task has been to discover more effective
applications of U.S. power and diplomacy in areas
vital to American interests which are either directly
or indirectly challenged by Soviet power.
This essay will address itself to the relation
ship between nuclear power and American foreign policy.
Specifically, it will deal with the doctrine of Tactical
Nuclear Warfare (TNW) which has emerged from many years
of policy debate on how nuclear weapons can best be
utilized*in deterring Soviet aggression in certain
strategic theatres. (The European theatre will provide
most examples for this study, as it is often regarded
as the most likely site for Soviet-American conflict.)
Beyond deterrence, TNW has been suggested as a strategy
for acquiring greater military and political leverage
for the realization of American goals. Tactical Nuclear
Warfare is by no means a recent option for U.S. policy
makers. President Eisenhower suggested in 195^ that
"our defense will be stronger if. . . w e share with
our allies certain knowledge of the tactical use of
our nuclear weapons."
2

And an examination of the doctrine

From the State of the Union address by President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, delivered before a joint session
of Congress, 7 January 195^ (House of Representatives
Document no. 251) 83 d Congress, 2d Session, 195^* P«

from the Eisenhower years to the Administration of
President James E. Carter will show that it has
developed and matured

as a tactic in the field of

military strategy.
Such an examination, however, will also disclose
that TNW has not "been taken seriously as a military
strategy by any administration. At best, it has
developed within the framework of deterrence. American
tactical nuclear forces (TNF) have never been considered
by the United States in terms of being part of a
military strategy. And they are currently not regarded
as offensive weapons. Rather, they are developed and
deployed by the United States with the sole consideration
of maintaining a balance of American and Russian
theatre nuclear power. The calculus of deterrence is
essentially one of numbers. How many warheads? How
much throw-weight? How much power and accuracy? Present
policy suggests that there is little need to consider
the offensive use of nuclear weapons. If deterrence
should fail, conventional forces will provide the first
resort. TNW is viewed only as a final act of desperation.
This essay will explore the hypothesis that until
Tactical Nuclear Warfare is incorporated into a military
strategy of first-use, tactical nuclear forces will

6

serve neither the purpose of theatre deterrence nor
of strengthening the relationship between power and
diplomacy. A corollary to this hypothesis is that
there is a distinction between deterrence and military
strategy, and that this distinction has yet to be
made in considerations of Tactical Nuclear Warfare by
U.S. strategists and policy makers alike.

II

The first clear expression of a United States
nuclear doctrine came in the Eisenhower years, and
was aptly labeled Massive Retaliation. It was pre
dicated on the assumption that if one could make the
cost of enemy aggression intolerable, such aggression
would be deterred. The Eisenhower Administration promulgated
a doctrine of immediate U.S. response with nuclear
capability if an opponent (namely the Soviet Union)
should attempt armed aggression in areas that the United
States perceived as vital to its interests. The response
would be in the form of a disarming first-strike directed
at targets in the Soviet Union, no matter how distant
from the act of aggression. Massive Retaliation aimed
at crippling the Soviet Union-- politically, economically,
and militarily.
The emergence of Massive Retaliation was a result
of basically three factors. First, it was a reaction
against the recent Korean experience.*^ Americans were
3
-'See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, ’’Deterrence
in History," in John E. Endicott and Roy Stafford, eds.,
American Defense Policy, 4th edition (Baltimore and London:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977)•

7

unaccustomed to the travails and ambiguities of
limited war, and a reliance on a nuclear deterrent
seemed preferable to the maintenance, and overseas
involvement, of a large conventional army for a prolonged
period of time. In fact, a reliance on nuclear weaponry
was understandable, given the power vacuum created by
the unilateral disarmament of American conventional forces
during the eighteen months following the Korean -War.
"Ground, air, and naval units literally melted away
until it became virtually impossible to calculate what
military forces, if any, the United States could muster
in the face of a serious Soviet threat. Thus, the stage
was inevitably set for almost totaJL dependence by the
United States on the deterrent threat of the atomic
bomb to offset the massive superiority of Soviet ground
A
forces. . . . "
The atomic bomb became the perfect
replacement for vanishing American ground forces in
maintaining a balance of power in post-War Europe.
Second, there was the consideration of costeffectiveness . The Eisenhower Administration was committed
k

Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity:
The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 19611971 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc.,
1973)* p. 5.

to reducing taxes and balancing the federal budget.
These domestic goals were not possible if the United
States maintained a comprehensive conventional military
posture. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
best summed up this point when he stated that America
needed allies and security, but by more effective and
less costly means than the large-scale commitment

of

American troops. "This can be done by placing more
reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on
local defensive power."-* As another observer of the time
put it, "the essence of the. . . policy is that it is
actually possible for the United States to have greater
security at less cost, with fewer soldiers, and
6
curtailed commitments abroad." The doctrine of Massive
Retaliation was a welcome relief to the American people
in so far as it would preclude the debilitating
economic drain of a large standing army.
Finally, Massive Retaliation can be seen as a
product of several occurrences internationally which
-*From "Evolution of Foreign Policy," address by
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, delivered
before the Council on Foreign Relations, 12 January 195^»
United States Department of State Bulletin 30:107
(25 January 195^)s 108 .
^Neal Stanford, "Two Looks at the New Look," in
Herbert L. Marx, Jr., ed., Defense and National Security
(New Yorks The H.W. Wilson Company^ 1955)i P« ^8*

10

encouraged the perception by policy makers that
world events were following an unacceptable course.
The Berlin Crisis of 19^8-19^9> the proliferation
of Communist regimes in Europe, the Communist rev
olution in China, and the Soviet A-Bomb test detonation
years ahead of U.S. expectations caused great alarm
within American policy making circles.

7

There.was a

desire to convert America'a nuclear weapons into an
effective leverage for the implementation of policies,
the most important being the preservation of the status
quo in the non-Communist world. The deterrence of
Communist threats to South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast
Asia, and Western Europe loomed large in the logic
of Massive Retaliation.
There were problems, however, with a doctrine
that necessitated a massive delivery of nuclear weapons
upon provocation. What type of provocation would be
deemed serious enough to precipitate nuclear war?
Indeed, exactly what acts of aggression would be de
terred by the threat of nuclear exchange? Could a nuclear
exchange be justified politically by an aggression
^See A.L. George and R. Smoke, "Deterrence in
History," American Defense Policy for an examination
of these factors.

11

other than a direct attack upon the United States?
Henry Kissinger summarizes well this dilemma.
By identifying deterrence with maximum
power. . . Massive Retaliation tends to
paralyze the will. . . .
Given the power
of modern weapons, a nation that relies on
all-out war as its chief deterrent imposes
a fearful psychological handicapp on itself,
The most agonizing decision a statesman
can face is whether or not
to unleash allout war; all the pressures
will make for
hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening
the national existence.8
Thus, the very credibility of Massive Retaliation
was at once questionable, particularly after the
Soviet Union began developing its own strategic
force. Policy makers could not envisage bringing about
a nuclear holocaust and certain self-destruction for the
United States because of a theatre conflict far from
its shores. Would New York and Chicago, for example, be
exchanged for Berlin, or for some lesser provocation
such as a
Would

minor border incursion in Korea or Finland?

the American people accept a nuclear exchange for

any cause other than their own survival? In short, the
use of Massive Retaliation in anything other than a
general Soviet-American war lacked credibility as a
military strategy. It might well be argued that it
g
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy, p. 133*
-*

12

lacked credibility as a deterrent as well, at least
in theatre scenarios in which the survival of the United
States was not at stake (e.g., a regional conflict in
Africa). As Henry Kissinger argues, "A deterrent which
one is afraid to implement when it is challenged ceases
to be a deterrent.

9

Mot only would an enemy interpret Massive
Retaliation as a bluff, but the doctrine itself would
present American policy makers with few alternatives
between general nuclear war and acquiescence in piecemeal
aggression. As one author has put it, "reliance upon
massive retaliation not only stultfied the development
of new policy but encouraged a Maginot Line mentality-dependence upon a strategy which may collapse or never
be used, but which meanwhile prevents the consideration
of any alternative."

10

.
Militarily, while perhaps

deterring the Soviet Union from general war with the
United States, Massive Retaliation left few alternatives
to strategists for coping with theatre conflict, a
localized outbreak of hostilities. Conventional strength
and presence were expected to be at a minimum as, afterall,
^Ibid., p . 13^.
10
Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity,
pp. 36-37.

this was one reason for the existence of the doctrine,
but without a conventional posture in the "gray areas,"
the military would be impotent. However, if a
conventional posture were assumed, a significant purpose
of Massive Retaliation—

reliance on nuclear rather

than conventional capability—

would go for naught.

This was an uneasy paradox and few would now disagree
with Kissinger that "strategy can assist policy only by
developing a maximun number of stages between total peace
(which may mean total surrender) and total war."

11

There were two basic needs, then, as U.S. strategic
doctrine entered the 1960s. First, there was the continued
need to deter a Soviet first-strike, which Massive
Retaliation seemed to do. Second, there was a need
for greater flexibility in deterring and, if necessary,
countering Soviet inspired and/or supported theatre wars
which might not warrant a general war jeopardizing the
survival of the United States.
11

Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Wenaons and Foreign
Policy, p. 136.

Ill
While Massive Retaliation was based upon the
premise of completely obliterating the enemy in light
of "sufficient" provocation, the doctrine of Assured
Destruction was the result of the reassessment of
strategic doctrine within the context of increasing
Soviet nuclear capability. The essence of military
philosophy underlying Massive Retaliation, as mentioned
above, was to deter Soviet aggression by the threat of
a disarming and highly damaging strike with America'-a
nuclear force. The Kennedy Administration sought to
shift this philosophy by recognizing first, that a
disarming first-strike against the Soviet Union was no
longer possible and second, that the ability of both
nations to destroy each other would serve as a deterrent
to general war. One student has noted that this shift
was primarily motivated by our view of the
arms race: we feared that our effort to main
tain a capability for a disarming strike would
stimulate a disarming buildup of Soviet forces;
and conversely, we hoped that our restraint
would be reciprocated .12
12

Fred C. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out
the Century?" Foreign Affairs 51:2 (January 1973)** 270.

1^

Assured Destruction, then, had two basic func
tions. One, "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon
13
the United States or its allies," J and two* to bring a
semblance of stability to strategic doctrine and a
nuclear arms race. The Kennedy Administration correctly
recognized that there was nothing that the United States
could have done (at least nothing short of a massive
first-strike in the early 1950s when Soviet nuclear
capability was low), or could now do to prevent the
Soviet Union from acquiring a second-strike capability.
Even a massive nuclear retaliation would not destroy the
ability of the U.S.S.R. to launch an unacceptable attack
upon the United States. The Soviet sense of insecurity
with regard to the West would drive them on toward
achieving some measure of parity. Assured Destruction
was an attempt, therefore, to possess an effective
deterrent by assuring the U.S. "the capability to destroy
the aggressor as a viable society even after a surprise
1 2j,
attack."
By calculating how much nuclear weaponry
13
-'Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security:
Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1968 ), p. 52.
14

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before
the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
89 th Congress, 1st Session, 24 FebruSwry 1965* Hearings
on Military Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, p. 43.

16

would be required to destroy an arbitrary percentage
of the Soviet population, industry, and military
capability, Assured Destruction sought to create a
stable deterrent to general war between the United
States and the Soviet Union. If, for example, 1000
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) were required
to destroy a third of the Soviet population and twothirds of Soviet industrial and military capability,
then there would be no need for U.S. deployment of
nuclear weaponry beyond that level. It was hoped that
this calculated approach to deterrence would be duplicated
by Soviet strategists, thus curbing an arms race.
As a deterrent, Assured Destruction was little
different from Massive Retaliation. Both doctrines were
predicated on the assumption that if an unacceptable
amount of damage could be inflicted upon the Soviet Union
so as to make the costs of general war exceed the benefits,
then general war would be deterred. And, as a general
deterrent, Assured Destruction was subject to the same
criticisms which plagued Massive Retaliation, namely
the lack of options short of surrender and nuclear
holocaust which policy makers could consider in a crisis

17
situation. Van Cleave and Barnett note that Assured
Destruction was "necessary—

hut insufficient." Its

problem was a "lack of sufficient options between no
15
response and large-scale responses." ^ But it was
different from Massive Retaliation in so far as
designating how iiuch was necessary for deterrence. And
perhaps more importantly, it differed in its assessment
of what exactly it could deter.
There were no pretensions within the Kennedy
Administration that strategic nuclear weapons could be
used in .any other way except to deter general war
with the Soviet Union. This line of thought, ipso facto,
necessitated greater emphasis on the fighting of lesser
wars than those of an all-out exchange, and this emphasis
was reflected in the efforts of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara to procure a more effective conventional
posture for the United States. Believing that the Soviets
had set a determined course of exacerbating third-world
i< .
-'William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett,
"Strategic Adaptability," in Robert J. Pranger and
Roger P. Labrie, Nuclear Strategy and National Security:
Points of View (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise
Institute for Policy Research, 1977)» PP» 214-17.

18
conflicts into theatre wars,

1 fi

McNamara stressed the

need for an "adequate level of non-nuclear military
strength. . , to meet a limited challenge with limited
f o r c e s . T h u s the concept of limited war became
prominent in the Kennedy Administration, But the
military response in a limited conflict was to he con
ventional, not nuclear. A build-up of non-nuclear forces
was seen as the key to increasing the American capacity
to "tailor.

. .

responses to a particular military

challenge to that level of force which is both appropriate
to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our
1R
•' side."
There was little room for the consideration
of tactical nuclear force. As McNamara would say, the
United States "could not substitute tactical nuclear
weapons for conventional forces in the types of conflict
16

It was widely believed by many at that time
that Soviet strategy concentrated on third-world "hot
spots." Soviet Chairman Khrushchev contributed to this
belief by outlining Soviet aims as precluding both
general war and direct theatre conflict with the United
States for the reason of probable escalation to thermo
nuclear war. He stressed, however, that liberation wars
in third-world countries were inevitable as long as
imperialism existed. For many American policy makers,
this was an ominous note.
17
1Robert S. McNamara, from a speech given before
the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 17
February 1962, in Vital Speeches 28:10 (March 1962): 297*
18Ibid.. p. 2$8 .

19
that were most likely to involve" the United States
"in the period of the 1960s,

(Localized third-

world conflict).
Even though the Kennedy Administration accepted
that "an effective tactical nuclear capability was
essential to overall strategy,"

20

little serious

attention was given to the development and implementation
of a tactical nuclear doctrine. The consensus among
policy makers at the time was that, as Khrushchev stated,
Tactical Nuclear Warfare was simply the first step toward
holocaust. Escalation to strategic weaponry seemed
inevitable after a first use. Furthermore, it was felt
that it would only be a matter of time before the
Soviets duplicated the American effort at developing
a tactical nuclear force, thus leading to a similar
stalemate of power that followed the buildup of Soviet
strategic forces. This reasoning changed little through
the Johnson years, as that Administration was involved
in a problem more pressing and real than considerations
of theoretical scenarios of TNF theatre conflict; Vietnam.
Thus, TNW doctrine remained as it was in the Kennedy
years, until the coming of the Nixon Administration,
ig

^Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security, p. 6 9 .
20 Ibid.

IV

In a hearing before the Armed Services Committee
on the FY 1973 defense budget, Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird stated that the United States planned
to relate its "nuclear weapons posture in the theatre
to its conventional posture" so as to create options
short of sole reliance on strategic nuclear weapons
should a crisis arise.

21

This would, 111 Laird's words,

allow "maximum flexibility of response.
22
deterrence fail."

. . should

Indeed, the defense posture presented to the
country by the Nixon Administration was in stark
contrast to those of previous administrations. The
"Nixon Doctrine" called for a retreat of American forces
from around the world, emphasising a reliance on increasing
allied responsibility instead. Furthermore, it recog
nized the status of the Soviet Union as a comparable
nuclear power, asking only a strategic sufficiency on
21

Melvin R. Laird, cited in Endicott and Stafford,
eds„, American Defense Policy, p. 81.
22 Ibid.

20

21
23
the part of the United States, ^ and it incorporated

the doctrine of Tactical Nuclear Warfare into its
calculations of military and political flexibility.
The latter is the concern of this essay. Why did TNW
achieve higher status in the Nixon Administration than
in the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, or
Johnson? Why was 1972 so different from previous years
in terms of nuclear strategy? What had happened to
facilitate a more welcome response from strategists and
policy makers to TNW?
Perhaps the basic cause of the shift toward
Tactical Nuclear Warfare as a doctrine for theatre
conflict was the rise of Soviet capability. With the
United States heavily involved in Vietnam for the better
part of a decade, the Soviet Union capitalized on the
on the opportunity to make marked improvements in its
strategic posture (see Figure A). The leveling off of
U.S. ICBM and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
deployments illustrates the earlier doctrine of Assured
23
^Strategic sufficiency was predicated upon
fulfilling the following the following criteria:
(1) Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability
to deter an all-out surprise attack on U.S. strategic
forces; (2) providing no incentive for the Soviet
Union to strike the United States first in a crisis;
(3 ) preventing a grave imbalance in strategic forces;
and (4) defending against damage from small attacks
or accidental launches.

FIGURE A*
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(Washington,' D.C . , 1978)Destruction as well as Nixon's doctrine of strategic
sufficiency. Deployment of strategic weaponry was to
he only at that level which guaranteed the destruction
of a viable Soviet society, i.e., an arbitrary percentage
of population and military-industrial capacity. As can
be seen in the chart, there was even a substantial
reduction of the U.S. bomber force, long the foundation of
American deterrence. But Soviet deployment of both
conventional and nuclear weapons continued to increase
until the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I)
Agreement of May, 1972 which established deployment
ceilings for ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.

Be that as' it may, after involvement in Vietnam
came to an end, the United States found itself at a
serious conventional disadvantage in the European
theatre. In addition to growing Soviet strategic and
conventional capability, it also found itself confronted
by ever growing Soviet tactical nuclear forces.
Within this context, it is possible to explore TNW as
a doctrine. What did it hope to accomplish? What was
its purpose? And how was it received critically?
While Nixon and Laird introduced a more developed
concept of TNW than had previous defense spokesmen, it
was Secretary of Defense James L. Schlesinger who
attempted to transform the concept into strategy, giving
TNW specific definition. This involved, basically, a
change in targeting doctrine, or exactly where missiles
are to be sent, in what force, and under what circum
stances. Whereas McNamara had addressed targeting doctrin
early on in the Kennedy Administration,

oh

it was only

as a part of Assured Destruction. McNamara's counter
force strategy involved a more selective procedure in
targeting strategic forces than Eisenhower's policy
of massive and arbitrary strikes on Soviet sites. The
2h

See R. McNamara, from an address given at Ann
Arbor, Michigan, 16 .June 1962, in Department of State
Bulletin 47:1202 (9July 1962 ): 64-59.

purpose of counterforce strategy was to give body to
nuclear military strategy in case a general war be
came a reality. It was thought that nuclear targeting
in an atomic exchange should be no different from
strategic bombing in World War II where the object of
targeting was less to intimidate the enemy by inflicting
unacceptable losses than neutralization of its militaryindustrial capacity.
Schlesinger introduced a.new form of counter
force strategy to allow the military greater flexibility
in a nuclear exchange. It was the recognition that
deterrence might fail and that conflict between the
superpowers might ensue which led to this assessment.
If a war had to be fought perhaps it could be fought in
a limited way. If there was available to the military
flexibility in their response to aggression, then perhap
the level of nuclear exchange could be regulated, short
of massive retaliation.
What the change in targeting doctrine does
is give the President of the United States
the option of limiting strikes down to a
few weapons. It would be understood that, if
the United States were to strike the Soviet
Union in response to some hypothetical act

25
on their part, this would not have to
he a massive response'.25
The creation of more military options In a
nuclear exchange could, in turn, create more political
options. Certainly, the possibility of a limited nuclear
response to Soviet theatre aggression v/ould be per
ceived by the Soviets a,s more credible than an un
inhibited nuclear exchange. Hence, "the effect of the
emphasis on selectivity and flexibility.

. . would be

to improve deterrence across the spectrum of risks."

26

Tactical Nuclear Warfare, then, appealed to
strategists for a variety of reasons. Since the possibility
of a nuclear war could not be denied, the President must
never be limited to a choice between acquiescence to
an aggressor, or exhausting America's nuclear arsenal
in an exchange. "Since there is a great uncertainty
about how a nuclear war might start, response should be
27
available to deal with a wide range of possibilities." {
25

<James R. Schlesmger, in report to the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, International Lav/ and Organizations of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, in U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Strategic Policies, 93nd Congress, 2d Session, k March
1974. p. 106 .
~
26Ibid.. p. 105.
27
'Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New
Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" Foreign Affairs
(July 197*0 : 765 •

26
pQ

Tactical nuclear weapons of a low-yield nature, '
placed contiguously in strategically vital areas
permit a maximum of counterforce capability.

29

Low-

yield weapons permit the targeting of military-industrial
sites without an inordinate population kill. Hence,
nuclear exchange could be kept almost entirely
at a military-industrial level, and strategically
contiguous weapons (Foward Based Systems) would increase
the accuracy of TNF used. Thus, a combination of
low-yield weapons and a -high degree of accuracy would
contribute to a more controlled targeting and, it was
hoped, a more controlled exchange. Needless to say,
a more controlled exchange would enhance credibility
and deterrence. (It would do well to note that this
point had been made by some scholars in the late fifties
and the sixties—

Brodie, Kissinger, Kahn, Wolfers—

but policy is rarely a contemporary of theory.)
p Q

Low-yield nuclear weapons might be defined
as those v/eapons with an explosive power of 30 kilotons (30 thousand tons equivalent TNT) which, upon
detonation, produce effects which remain in the lower
atmosphere and are thus entirely local.
29
- ■
'Counterforce capability is defined as that
capability to destroy military industrial sites.
Countervalue capability involves only civilian targets,
i.e., cities.

Another concern expressed by proponents of
TNW was the fact that the Soviets were acquiring
greater depth in their tactical nuclear forces. If
the Soviet Union were to initiate tactical nuclear war,
would the United States be able to respond at a
level commensurate with Soviet use? That kind of capacity,
Schlesinger noted, would have to be accompanied by
appropriate training in Tactical Nuclear Warfare use
as well as the planning in anticipation of the difficultie
involved.
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Schlesinger further warned that it was not

a wise strategy to delay considerations of TNW until
pressed by circumstances.
Rather one should think through the prob
lems in advance and put together relevant,
small packages which a President could choose
under the circumstances in which they might
be required.3i
The failure to acquire a TNW capability which
could adequately meet a Soviet first use would result
in a serious military disadvantage in the field, and
perhaps make unavoidable an escalation to the level of
general war. For example, if Soviet forces utilized
tactical nuclear weapons in a European theatre conflict,
30

James Schlesinger, in Report to the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, U.S.-U.-S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. '107*
31Ibid.
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selectively neutralizing military targets (communi
cation, "bridges, supply railways, and TNF storage
areas) while sparing civilian population by use of
low-yield weaponry, could the United States respond
in kind? If not, there would be several unpleasant
options from which to choose. Beginning with the
assumption that NATO's nuclear stockpiles have all
but been destroyed by Soviet counterforce strategy, the
options for NATO are to (1) acquiesce in Soviet gains;
(2 ) continue to .fight a conventional war; (3 ) resort to
the use of what TNF was left after Soviet counterforce
strikes; and (k) launch strategic weapons in response,
due to the lack of an effective TNF doctrine of use.
The first two options can be labeled as unequivocal
defeat. The third seems, at best, weak, and would simply
be a defensive response well after Soviet gains had
been consolidated. The last Option can be seen as
self-defeating and a return to the dilemma of Massive
Retaliation. Nuclear suicide for the United States would
simply not be a rational response for the loss of X
amount of European territory. Without a capability for
TNW, the first option (acquiescence) would seem the
only reasonable alternative. The second would leave
NATO forces at a gross disadvantage; the third would
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be a late reaction, ineffective due to damage
incurred by Soviet counterforce strategy; and the
fourth would be suicidal.
Strategists for a TNW capability, therefore,
argued the necessity for a doctrine of nuclear
weapons use. Such a doctrine would supply U.S. and
allied forces with TNW options from which political
and military leaders could choose as the exigencies
of conflict demand.
There were, however, several criticisms of
selective targeting, tactical counterforce strategy,
and TNW doctrine in general. Simply because Schlesinger,
as Secretary of Defense, introduced a targeting doctrine
which encouraged flexible response with nuclear weapons
in a theatre conflict did not assure the broad im
plementation of TNW as military doctrine. There were
politicians at home and allies abroad who had to be
convinced of the wisdom of TNW, and the problems involved
could properly be regarded as substantial.
There was the fear that "as nuclear war becomes
12

more manageable, it also becomes more likely."^

It is

true that to use low-yield, strategically contiguous
tactical nuclear weapons might make the exchange of
-^Greenwood and Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate,"
Foreign Affairs, p. ?66,

30
such weaponry more manageable. Because a more definite
control of weapons can be attained with TNF, strategic
objectives can be better implemented. All of this,
theoretically, makes a tactical exchange quite "safe"
in the sense that there is a low probability of es
calation to general war. The capacity to fight TNW
seems a major plus in creating a myriad of options,
both of a political and military nature. But might the
mere presence of a great number of "safe" options
encourage their use? Might a capability for TNW guarantee
its place on the battlefield? Indeed, might the very fact
that one power is developing a TNW capability force the
other power to consider it more seriously as a military
doctrine? In short, "as the use of nuclear weapons be
comes more thinkable, it also becomes more acceptable.

ll

It is, after all, the uncertainty involved in calculations
of any nuclear exchange which should provide a deterrent
against their use. When the use of TNF becomes a military
art of precision and an effective counterforce strategy,
then predictability of nuclear exchange becomes a reality
and the uncertainty involved in deterrence fades, thus
making Tactical Nuclear Warfare more probable.
^^Ibid., p. ?6 6 .

Another, more profound, criticism is that TNW
as a military doctrine is not possible at all. It can
only be the initial stage in an escalation toward
general war. Consider the scenario: Theatre conflicts
emerge in Europe and the Middle East. Warsaw Pact troops
make a conventional push into the Federal Republic of
Germany while Soviet surrogates precipitate armed con
flict against Istael and interfere with petroleum
deliveries both to Israel and the United States. The
U.S. decides to respond with Tactical Nuclear Warfare
in Europe-- low-yield, accurate counterforce strikes-to alleviate military disadvantage for NATO forces and
at the same time send a warning signal to hostile forces
in the Middle East. It would be hoped that such a display
of TNF would show the resolve on the part of the West to
resist aggression, and the willingness to escalate if
necessary. Theoretically, the possibility of escalation
is enough of a deterrent to at least prevent further
aggression and to perhaps stabilize the situation. But
the question remains: Will the Soviet Union perceive
correctly the intricacies of strategy involved in the
U.S. response, or, rather, will they view it as the first
stage in an attempted American effort to neutralize Soviet
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power by strategic exchange? They will then respond,
accordingly, by launching ICBMs? Thus there is the
problem of distinguishing between TNW and general war.
The above scenario illustrates the problem of
a mutual understanding with regard to the use of
TNF. There may simply be none. For example, there is
no agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union (or any other nuclear powers for that matter) as
to what criteria exist for determining a proper target
for tactical nuclear weapons. Or, indeed, there is no
understanding as to what constitutes a tactical nuclear
weapon. Is it a weapon with 20 kilotons of force? 50
kilotons? 100 kilotons? Can it be launched from a
location far removed from the theatre, a submarine for
example? Should TNF be measured by range, power, or by
effect? Even if there is agreement on exactly what a
tactical nuclear weapon is, can the belligerents limit
destruction with their use in a manner commensurate
with the limited objectives of the conflict? If not,
'ih,
escalation is very probable*
The potential problems posed by TNW have led to
an ambivalence on the part of policy makers in incorporating
J See Robert E. Osgood for an exposition on the
problems associated with TNW, particularly the problem
of mutual definition' between belligerents, in Limited
War: The Challenge of American Strategy (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1957)*

its tenets into military strategy. For Americans, the
use of TNF portends escalation and unimaginable destruction
to the United States, and for what? Control of the
Rhine or the Ruhr? NATO members in Europe are also
understandably anxious about TNW doctrine, even more
so than Americans. Any implementation of TNW will more
than likely take place within their territory. And yet
there is a realization among both Americans and their
allies that, in Europe, Warsaw Fact forces greatly out
number their NATO counterparts, and elsewhere Soviet
military activity is at an unprecedented level of deploy
ment. Not only is Soviet conventional power a challenge,
but Soviet TNF is substantial, confronting the allies
with the most unpleasant of possibilities should war
occur. In addition to a general ambivalence toward TNW
then, there is also the desire to have available the
military flexibility and political options which possession
of a doctrine of use would offer.
As Kissinger would say, "We thus return to the
basic problem of limited war in the nuclear age: where
to strike the balance between the desire for posing
the maximum threat and the need for a strategy which
35
does not paralyze the will."-'*' The remainder of the thesis

35
^ •'Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy, p. 191.

3*

will deal with current United States TNW doctrine
as expressed by the Carter Administration- and will
consider how well it confronts the problem of relating
nuclear power to diplomacy and military strategy, par
ticularly in theatre considerations. An examination of
the strategy and tactics of tactical nuclear war will
provide the conclusion.

V

In current TNW doctrine, as expressed by the
Carter Administration, there is no deviation from the
pattern of U.S. nuclear weapons policy historical
development. First and foremost, there is the goal
of deterring a Soviet first-strike against the United
States. This is done by retaining "the capability at
all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage
on the Soviet Union, including the destruction of a
minimum of 200 major Soviet cities."-^ The current
policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to deter
a first-strike is consistent with earlier doctrines
of Massive Retaliation and Assured Destruction in that
it assumes that making the costs of a first-strike exceed
its benefits will deter a rational adversary.
The mainstay of MAD is the concept of Essential
Equivalence; that the United States possess a nuclear
strike power roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union.
-^Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, cited in
Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979
(Washington, D.C.s Government Printing Office, 1978),
p. 55-
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This concept is not far removed from the sufficiency
doctrine posited by the Nixon Administration. According
to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Essential
Equivalence serves four major purposes. "It helps
to ensure that political perceptions are in accord
with the military realities.

, . ; it minimizes the

probability that opposing strategic forces will be used
to seek any diplomatic advantage; it reduces the chance
that one side or the other will become vulnerable to
charges of a bomber or missile gap.

. . .,

thereby

contributing to strategic stability in a crisis by
reducing the incentives for either side to strike first
or pre-empt; and it provides a stable framework through
which to effect arms reduction.
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Essential Equivalence

is the guarantee that the United States will possess a
second-strike capability-^ with regard to the Soviet
Union, thus deterring general war. As Brown suggests,
by requiring that the United States possess an essentially
•^Ibid., pp. 56 -5 7 •
-^A second-strike capability is that capability
which permits a nation to absorb a nuclear attack and
have sufficient nuclear weaponry left to respond with
an attack of its own which will exact a comparable
degree of destruction on the aggressor.

equivalent nuclear capability vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, perceptions of strategic inequality which may
encourage first-strike attempts are discouraged.
Under Carter, TNW doctrine remains basically
the same as when expressed by Laird and Schlesinger.
TNF is maintained "to complement and provide a link
between conventional and strategic nuclear forces."That is, tactical nuclear weapons are envisaged as
providing options between conventional defeat and
nuclear holocaust. The United States "must not be
committed to a single, inflexible war plan,"

Theatre

nuclear weapons, in the Carter Administration, are thus
given a role similar to the role given them by Nixon.
In a time of crisis a TNF capability will present alterna
tives of flexibility to the decision maker. But, more
importantly, TNF capability represents a more credible
deterrent than strategic capability to Soviet theatre
aggression. "TNFs are intended to deter theatre nuclear
attacks in conjunction with conventional forces.

hi
. . ."'

This observation introduces a very significant point
in the development of TNW doctrine.
Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 1979 1 p. 130.
^ Ibid., p. 42.
kl
Ibid., p. 130. Also see Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance before the Royal Institute for International Affair
London, in Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.: Bureau
of Public Affairs, 1978 ) .
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In retrospect, the history of U.S. nuclear
weapons policy reveals two lines of development.
The most consistent of these, from Eisenhower to
Carter, has been the Massive Retaliation concept of
deterrence. This has remained in one form or another
and has differed from one administration to the next
only in estimations of what it could accomplish.
Under Eisenhower, it was believed that Massive Re
taliation could deter any act of aggression anywhere.
Assured Destruction, it has been shown, still
guaranteed the massive response of nuclear exchange,
but only if confronted by the threat of a Soviet
first-strike. It recognized the limits of massive
buildups of nuclear stockpiles, as well as what a
massive response doctrine could deter. Strategic
Sufficiency and Essential Equivalence are both pre
dicated upon the strategy of a massive U.S. nuclear
response to a Soviet first-strike, albeit the targeting
of such response had been refined to include greater
counterforce capability. The 1970s have seen the
inclusion of targeting flexibility in calculations of
how massive a nuclear response should be. But the
essential mission of U.S. strategic forces contined to
be measured by its massive destructive capability.

A second line in nuclear weapons policy has
been that of flexible response. Recognizing the failure
of Massive Retaliation in deterring acts of aggression
lesser in magnitude than a first-strike against the
United States, policy makers moved toward creating a
more credible response to non-nuclear aggression.
McNamara implemented programs which enhanced American
conventional forces, and saw these forces as the answer
to U.S. impotency in taking forceful action around the
world short of nuclear exchange. However, as Soviet
strategic and tactical capability grew during U.S.
involvement in Southeast Asia, post-Vietnam administrations
have seen the need to incorporate Tactical Nuclear
Warfare in theatre scenarios. The significance of
this move, however, lies not in the move itself, but
in how TNW doctrine has been incorporated in U.S.
nuclear weapons policy.
In The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World
1±2
Order.
Bernard Brodie and Arnold Wolfers suggested
that, whereas in the past, before nuclear weapons, the
purpose of U.S. military doctrine had been to win wars,
Il o

Bernard Brodie and Arnold Wolfers, eds., The
Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New
Y ork s Hare ourt, Brac e and C ompany, 19^6).
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in the future, it must be to avert them, to deter them.
Indeed, the consistency involved in strategic thinking
throughout U.S. post-War history well reflects this
shift. As has been noted, Massive Retaliation, Assured
Destruction, Strategic Sufficiency, and MAD

all share

the common theme of deterrence. Furthermore, the shift
in strategic thought from winning wars to deterring
them has involved all facets of warfare, including
conventional and tactical nuclear forces.
When McNamara emphasized the shoring up of Am
erica's conventional posture, it was for the purpose
of meeting small-scale military threats which could not
be met with strategic nuclear weapons, for example,
guerrilla wars, East-West border skirmishes (perhaps
Berlin), and possibly more, intense conventional conflicts.
Tactical nuclear weapons were valued primarily with
respect to their role as a deterrent in U.S. theatre
strategy, supplementing the strategic nuclear
umbrella. How "an effective tactical nuclear capability
43
was essential to . . • overall strategy" J was at best
an ambiguous matter for the Kennedy Administration.
43
-'Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security,
p. 6 9 .
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In addressing the Senate Subcommittee on Arms
Control on the topic of targeting strategy and the role
of limited/tactical nuclear war, Secretary Schlesinger
stated that, to the extent they make "the possible use
of U.S. strategic forces more credible, (TNFs) have
a beneficial effect on deterrence."

44

Confronted by

increasing Soviet tactical and conventional forces
(particularly in Europe), the Nixon Administration was
concerned about how to deter aggression which the Soviets
might directly or indirectly encourage because of
perceiving post-Vietnam America as restrained by domestic
forces. The shift toward considering TNW more seriously
is understandable given the context of a debilitated
United States, its strength sapped by years of involvement
in Southeast Asia. It was hoped that the possibility of
TNW, if allied conventional forces were challenged by
an adversary, would deter the challenge from proceeding
beyond the initial stage. Furthermore, given the recent
growth of Soviet TNF capability, the mere possession
of tactical nuclear weapons was seen as the absolute
minimum in the maintenance of deterrence. Harold Brown,
for example, states that "U.S. theatre nuclear forces
44

Schlesinger to Subcommittee on Arms Control,
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 108.

have a symbolic importance that transcends their
kcC

direct military v a l u e . B r o w n continues:
There is no evidence that nuclear firepower
can substitute for the other elements of a
conventional capability. . . . Nonetheless,
the TNFs play a vital role in our overall
^
posture of deterrence and collective security.
Tactical Nuclear Warfare, then, has been considered
by successive administrations since Eisenhower, but
within the framework of deterrence. Theoretically, the
possible use of TNW in theatre conflict has been
credited with providing more options to policy makers,
options between the extremes of acquiescence and ex
haustive nuclear exchange. But even the possiblity of
use has been valued only as a deterrent, not as a
first-use weapon of war. In a review of the relevant
literature it is difficult to find assessments of the
military value of TNW. Dominating any discussion of
TNF use is the concept of deterrence. Glenn Snyder
accurately notes that "deterrence in war is most sharply
illustrated in proposals for a strategy of limited
retaliation, in which initial strikes, in effect, would
be threats of further strikes to come, threats designed
^ H a r o l d Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 1979, p. 6 8 .

Ibid..

p .

67 .

i+7
to deter the enemy from further fighting,” ' Thus,

TNF has heen related to diplomacy and military strategy
as a bargaining chip, an equalizer in the game of
deterrence, and TNW doctrine is a card between the
bluff of massive retaliation and the folding of U.S.
forces during a crisis. It is a card which should force
the opponent to pursue a cautious game because he knows
that it can be played at any moment. Furthermore, it
is a card which should deter a game-winning risk.
The question with which this study deals, however,
is "Can the incorporation of TNW doctrine into strategic
considerations as a deterrent force, rather than as a
military weapon of first-use, actually be effective in
deterring aggression?" That is, if the enemy assesses
U.S. TNF capability as purely symbolic, as being en
tirely for the purpose of deterrence calculations as
opposed to actual use, then will the enemy be deterred?
The role of TNW as a deterrent force in U.S. military
doctrine may prove to be counterproductive in that its
value, measured only as an element in calculating
deterrence could devalue its credibility as a useable
tactic. The fact that TNW has not been seriously considere
Ln
'Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense: A
Theoretical Introduction," in Endicott and Stafford,
eds., American Defense Policy, p. 4 3 .
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as a viable doctrine may actually encourage Soviet
"testing" of U.S. and NATO determination to preserve
territorial integrity.

48

Certainly the risks involved

in "testing" are perceived as less if a major component
of deterrence loses its value. Put more candidly, is
the United States equipped with both the capability
and the doctrine to fight successfully a tactical
nuclear war? The most effective deterrent to Soviet
aggression, or "testing", is bound to be an affirmative
response with regard to both capability and doctrine.
48'
"Testing" can be defined as the creation
of scenarios in which the potential of conflict
exists. For example, Soviet inspired trouble in
Berlin, or, in a bolder move, a NATQ-Warsaw Pact
border crisis.

VI

When asked about Soviet intentions in challenging
the United States on a variety of fronts, General
Alexander Haig, Jr., former Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, stated that intentions were vague, not
amenable to measurement; that capability was the
LiQ
source of c o n c e r n . I n d e e d , m measurements of Soviet
capability and doctrine of use there is substance to
the belief that the U.S.S.R. is actively challenging
the U.S.A.

Conventionally, the U.S.S.R. possesses a

clear advantage over the United States (see Figure B),
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In terms of tanks, divisions of troops, artillery,
tactical aircraft, and surface/subsurface combatants,
the Soviet Union deploys almost twice what the U.S.
deploys. Also, by the most recent American intelligence
estimates, defense outlays, of the Soviet defense
establishment are clearly outstripping U.S. efforts
(see Figure C). The Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear
FIGURE C
Dollar Cost of Soviet Programs as a Percent cf US Defense Expenditures*
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capability is a respectable one, but so too is the
capability of the United States (see Figure D ) . If
a tactical nuclear war becomes a reality, numerical
capability will not be the issue. ^
What most certainly will weigh in the balance
of forces is the doctrine pertaining to the use of
TNF, Secretary Brown was cited earlier as emphasizing
the symbolic importance of U.S. tactical nuclear forces
to America's allies-- an importance which transcends
their military value because "there is no evidence that
nuclear firepower can substitute for the other elements
of a conventional capability."^

A question to ask

would be whether or not the Soviets share the U.S.
policy makers' perceptions of TNW capability as solely
or primarily of symbolic and deterrent value. The answer
62
seems to be a resounding "No."^
60
.
• •
^ In his report to Congress, United States Military
Posture for FY 1979, General George Brown, former Chair
man— Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "the current
inventory of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is becoming
obsolete and requires modernization. Many weapons now
available reflect technology of the 1950 s and 1960s."
He concluded by saying, however, that "improvements are
being made." p. 88. Of course, the analyst must consider
the source, as Brown has a case to make for DOD's budget.
-^See Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 1979, p. 68.
62
J Admittedely, there is a problem with the availability
of Soviet policy and doctrinal statements on TNW. The
mainstream of thought on this matter comes primarily from
Soviet military journals and publications, which do not
necessarily reflect official government policy.
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A survey of Soviet literature substantiates
Colonel Graham D. Vernon's observation that "the
Soviets consider the advent of nuclear weapons as a
watershed in the history of military development and
emphasize the war-fighting rather than deterrent value
of these weapons,"^

As Vernon notes, most articles

in Soviet military journals assume a nuclear environment
and give much attention to a doctrine of use.''

Little

or no consideration is given TNW as an element of
deterrence•
This is, of course, in contrast to U.S. and NATO
TNW policy. For example, NATO’s doctrine of TNF use is
to delay their employment in theatre conflict until the last
58
.
-'^Colonel Graham D. Vernon, ’’Soviet Options for
War in Europe: Nuclear or Conventional?" Strategic Review
(Winter 1979)* 60. Some of the literature which can be
used to examine recent Soviet thought on TNW: The
Offensive: A Soviet View (Translated and Published under
the Auspices of the United States Air Force); Selected
Soviet Military Writings, 1970-1975 (Translated and
Published under the Auspices of the United States Air
Force- U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). Also, see
fn #5^ below for specific Soviet books and articles on TNW.
54
J See specifically I.G. Zav’ yalov, "The New
Weapon and Military Art," in Selected Soviet Military
Writings, 1970-1975 (cited above); A.A. Grechko. On
Guard Over Peace and the Building of Communism (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1971); N.A. Lomov, Scientific Technical Progress
and the Revolution in Military"Affairs.(Moscow: Voenizdat,
1973); V- Ye Savkin, Basic Principles of Operational Art
and Tactics (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972); Marshal A.A. Grechko,
Armed Forces of the Soviet States (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975).
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*Sourco-:Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1979
(Washington, D.C., 1978 ).
possible moment. Rather than accept defeat, NATO
will employ nuclear weapons. But their primary value
is seen as a deterrent to the outbreak of hostilities.
The basic strategy in case of Soviet aggression in
central Europe is to withstand the offensive thrust
as long as possible utilizing conventional capability.
The allies possess sufficient reserve and supply power
to stem the tide of battle in the long-run, but if NATO
forces are not able to prolong the conflict without
suffering a ready and quick defeat by the Soviet blitzkrieg
capability, then they will resort to TNF use on a
selective scale, primarily to threaten escaltion, thereby

hoping to deter further aggression. Also, this
delayed first use puts the responsibility of escalation
squarely on the Soviet Union. If the logic of deterrence
is sound, a conflict between East and West in this
scenario would stabilize due to risk of escalation.
Current American TNW doctrine, however, pre
supposes that the Soviets measure nuclear exchange by
the same indices as do the Americans; that is, through
a calculus of deterrence. As noted above, Soviet military
literature indicates that this is not the case. At
the First Nuclear War Conference held in Washington
during the spring of 1979* Admiral J.T. Hayv/ard charged
that American strategists "have long labored under the
;persistent illusion that tactical nuclear weapons
would not be employed by the U.S.S.R. because of the
fear of a nuclear exchange. This is not a valid assumption
They will be employed where and when the Soviets determine
it will

be in their interest.

The seemingly

obvious statement to make at this point is that the
use of nuclear weapons is not in the interest of the
Soviet Union due to possible escalation; that re
gardless of the potential benefits of aggression, their
use can never outweigh the potential costs involved.
^ J . T. Hayward, "How a Nuclear War Would Be Fought,
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1979)* 26.
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This line of deterrent reasoning is the sig
nificant fallacy of U.S. TNW doctrine. Measurements of
possible conflict and TNF exchange between the U.S.
and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies
continue to take place within the context of deterrence.
Certainly it can be argued that the myriad of risks
that an aggressor would run in precipitating war would,
in all probability, deter precipitation. But such
assessments are sterile, excluding the real world of
conflict possibilities. War is not always the product
of nation A consciously and deliberately initiating
conflict with nation B. Often, conflict can be cumulative,
a product of unforeseen events; it can be spontaneous,
an overreaction to a completely fortuitous incident.
Whatever the cause, once conflict becomes a reality,
questions of risks and benefits can no longer be measured
within the context of a deterrent situation.
For example, in a scenario of European theatre
war there are several incentives inducing Soviet first
use of TNW. Given the Blitzkrieg capability of Warsaw
Pact conventional.forces (structured for a timely and
successful massive attack, which deemphasizes supply
and reserve networks), a short war will favor Pact forces
while a protracted one will work to their disadvantage.
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In conjunction with declaratory doctrine that the
early employment of TNF will yield decisive military
advantages, Soviet consideration of the time factor
seems to imply that nuclear war will be much shorter
in length than a conventional one and, therefore,
preferable. In other words, the risks of engaging in
prolonged conventional warfare with NATO are higher
than risks of escalation in effectively employed Tactical
Nuclear Warfare.
Another problem for the Soviets in conducting
a conventional war can be termed geopolitical. As one
student of Soviet military strategy has put it, "the
Soviets are well aware that the loyalties of the peoples
of (Warsaw Pact) countries are thin, and that a pro
longed war could create serious problems, particularly
given the the location of these countries astride the

^6

logistic lines of Soviet forces."3

Past revolts in

Hungary and Czechoslovakia serve as constant reminders
to the Soviets of their occupation status. And, of course,
there is the threat that a prolonged Soviet involvement
in theatre war will increase the probability of the
Chinese exploiting the situation for irredentist reasons.
^G.D. Vernon, "Soviet Options for War in Europe,"
Strategic Review, p.-62.
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A two-theatre war is not a situation that

the Soviet

Union, or any other country, desires. There is also
the consideration of NATO theatre nuclear deployment
should NATO he on the losing end of a military engagement.
Why give the NATO forces the opportunity to employ TNF
first, thereby possibly surrendering an important
military advantage? Why allow NATO the critical decision
of how much TNF to employ and where it is to be targeted,
hoping that the strike is not a pre-emptive one and that
there will be sufficient Soviet TNF remaining to effect
a counterstrike?
This scenario serves to illustrate how calculations
of risks and benefits may change according to the sit
uational context. In a theatre scenario of non-conflict,
tactical nuclear forces indeed serve to deter the
precipitation of conflict; the deterrent value is high.
But in a conflict scenario, at least for the Soviet Union,
the value of TNF assumes military dimensions which
supersede those of deterrence. Soviet TNW doctrine

-V!

is one of use in this context, and the recognition of
TNF deterrent value drops. The shift in calculation is to
how

the enemy's nuclear force will be employed, and this

calculation will determine what steps toward an actual
engagement in theatre warfare will be taken.

V II

If the above analysis of U.S. TNW doctrine is
correct, then American strategists and policy makers
have failed to make a crucial distinction in their
assessment of tactical nuclear force. It has been
concluded that while the United States possesses a
substantial tactical nuclear inventory, it lacks a
doctrine of military use. That is, there has been no
substantive effort on the part of the U.S. defense
establishment to incorporate TNF use into military
doctrine as a weapon to be used in armed engagement
like any other weapon of war. And, it was noted, this is
because nuclear weapons thinking has evolved solely
within the framework of deterrent strategy. ' TNFs have
been accorded a value only in so far as they figure in
calculations of deterrence.
<7

-"Carl H. Builder, an analyst with the RAND Corporation,
makes much the same point in suggesting that "the cumulative
effects of the Assured Destruction ethic upon our strategic
thinking" is that "counterforce capabilities are to be
eschewed. . . as being the fuel of an arms race and the
hairtriggers of instability."
"Why not First-Strike
Counterforce Capabilities?" Strategic Review (Spring 1979)i
3^. The "A.ssured Destruction ethic" has also had a pro
found impact upon the increasing counterforce capability
(and doctrinal development) of TNW as well.

It was further suggested that the role of TNF
as being of a deterrent value is counterproductive,
because the non-recognition of TNF numerical capability
as a part of a military doctrine of use is, in actuality,
a negation of the capability itself. In enemy calculations
of NATO weaponry employment, TNF is not a factor (until
the most exacting circumstances materialize) to be
considered in offensive arrangements. The negation of
TNF capability by the failure to integrate it into a
doctrine ,of use has led to a serious imbalance of forces
in theatre situations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which,
by all indications, accepts tactical nuclear weapons not
only as having deterrent value, but war-winning value
as well.
As current data on TNF stockpiles indicate (refer
above to figure D) the United States enjoys a
quantitative advantage over the U.S.S.R. But this study
suggests that U.S. TNF capability is more symbolic than
real and, thus, is inferior to the TNF capability of the
Soviet Union, which emphasizes military use. This seems to
imply two distinct types of capability, which will be
designated as "Potential Capability" and "Real Capability."
Potential Capability can be defined as quantitative supplies
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of weaponry which have the potential of being employed.
The potential TNF capability of the United States can
be measured as 7000+ tactical nuclear warheadsj that of
the Soviet Union as 4000+. Real Capability, in essence,
is defined by the doctrine of weaponry employment adhered
to by a nation's strategists. I have made the case that
there is at present an imbalance between U.S. and Soviet
TNF Real Capability, due primarily to the lack of a
comparable U.S. military doctrine of battlefield use
with that of the Soviet Union.
The current imbalance of TNF Real Capability portends
several challenges for American strategists. In con
siderations of deterrence, the failure to give adequate
attention to the development of Real Capability has led,
and continues to lead, to a deterioration of TNF deterrent
value. While it may be true that in non-conflict
scenarios (e.g., present NATO/Warsaw Pact status in the
European theatre) Potential Capability serves as a suffi
cient deterrent against the direct precipitation of
conflict by either power, should conflict emerge the
value of Real Capability becomes increasingly significant
in estimations of force employment. That is, how the
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Soviets employ their forces and exactly what forces
are employed may depend upon estimations of American
Real Capability, particularly with regard to tactical
nuclear forces. The Soviet Union will in all probability
employ tactical nuclear weapons in a theatre conflict
simply because they are effective weapons of war, and
their first-use guarantees an overwhelming military
advantage on the field. And this use can only be further
encouraged if Soviet estimates of NATO resistance do
not include a serious belief that NATO TNFs will be
used initially in the conflict. From a purely military
perspective, the temptation to use a decisive offensive
weapon while the opponent acquiesces seems overwhelming.
Equally important is the point, earlier made, that the
Soviets can hardly afford not to employ TNF given their
geopolitical problems. A scenario of conventional conflict
between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will serve to
illustrate the importance of a United States TNF Real
Capability.
Recalling that a theatre war of great duration
would result in a negative cost/benefit analysis by
Soviet strategists, an inverse relationshio can be
established between time and success in a conventional
war for Soviet and American forces (see Figure E)»
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FIGURE E

II

III

time
= soviet conventional force effectiveness
-- = american conventional force effectiveness

In the early stages of a war (I), the Soviets
will possess a substantial quantitative force advantage.
Victory, however, is not guaranteed by such an advantage.
A combination of factors quite outside measurements of
conventional capability could produce a stalemate and force
the Soviets into stage (II) where the effectiveness of
their conventional force decreases. Certainly it is folly
to think that the Soviets will continue conventional
engagement into stage (III). The brief time spent in
stage (II) will constitute a crucial decision making
moment for Soviet strategists, particularly with regard
to TNF employment. It is not an exaggeration to say that
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a comparable- U.S. TNF Real Capability will cause
carefully measured deliberation among the Soviets in
deciding whether or not it is in their interest to
employ TNF, and may be the difference between compromise
ar stage (II), or escalation onto another plane of
confrontation- nuclear exchange.
If there is an imperative expressed in this
essay, it must be found in the necessity

for U.S.

strategists to recognize the dual nature of American
TNF capability. An examination of TNW doctrine from
Eisenhower to Carter has shown that no such recognition
exists. The employment of tactical nuclear force has
been consistently viewed as a supplement to U.S. deterrent
strategy, theoretically providing increased flexibility
in crisis policy options, thus serving as a more
credible deterrent to aggression. Long ignored has been
the distinction between deterrence and military strategy,
and the fact that tactical nuclear weapons must be
valued within both contexts.
United States tactical nuclear doctrine up to
this time, however, has been captive to the concept of
deference. Various criticisms of TNF use explored
earlier on in this essay have precluded serious consideration

of TNW within the context of military strategy. Thus*
the paradox of U.S. tactical nuclear weaponry as
potentially capable but in actuality impotent, lacking
Real Capability, Conversely, Soviet literature and
military exercise reveal a substantial level of Real
Capability in military doctrine. Without integrating
tactical nuclear forces into American military doctrine,
the difference in Real Capability between the United
States and its chief adversary will continue to persist,
perhpas inviting the very consequences that they are
meant to deter.
Real Capability of TNF first-use v/ould provide
the United States, and NATO, with two things. First,
if Soviet estimations of U.S./NATO response to theatre
conflict include the immediate use of tactical nuclear
weapons, then the risks of any incursion or conflict
are compounded. The compounding of risks would supplement
the deterrent value of NATO’s TNF in both non-conflict
and conflict scenarios. Second, and more importantly,
should conflict emerge, the NATO forces could utilze
nuclear weapons for military advantage. As much as
strategists consider the risks of escalation in the use
of TNF, it cannot cannot be denied that nuclear weapons
are part and parcel of both Soviet and U.S. arsenals.
And, they can be decisive in a military conflict.
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Speculating on the employment of tactical nuclear
weapons in a Soviet-American theatre war is not an
enviable task on the part of strategists and policy
makers. But these weapons do exist and, as it has been
suggested, must be integrated into military tactics and
strategy for what they are—

contemporary weapons of

war. It must be assumed that, as weapons of war, they
will be used in an East-West theatre conflict where
the stakes are high, such as in Europe. And consequently,
in assessments of the military advantages to be gained
by nuclear weapons use, it is in the interest of the
United States and its allies to acquire a TNF first.use capability.
Recalling earlier criticisms of Tactical Nuclear
Warfare, however, one is forced to challenge the state
ment that TNF use can be in the interest of any nation.
The problem of distinguishing between tactical nuclear
weapons use and strategic nuclear weapons use is not
insignificant. The failure to make such a distinction
could, and probably would, lead to an escalation to
general nuclear exchange. Since this essay recommends
a military doctrine of TNF first-use in American-Soviet
theatre conflict, it must, then, deal with this, and
other, criticisms of Tactical Nuclear Warfare.

In the Strategy of Conflict, Thomas C. Schilling
adequately outlines the basic problem of distinguishing
between tactical nuclear weapons and their strategic
counterparts. The problem is not seen so much as creating
a distinction than as eroding one. To elaborate,
Schelling sees the major distinction in weaponry not
as strategic and tactical, but as nuclear and non-nuclear.
He makes the point that
A distinction exists between nuclear and other
weapons even though the distinction is not
physical but is psychic, perceptual, legalistic,
or symbolic. That small-yield nuclears delivered
with ’pinpoint’ accuracy are just a form of
artillery, and consequently do not prejudice
the issue of limits in war, is an argument based
exclusively on an anlysis of weapons■effects.58
According to Schelling, nuclear weapons have not
been used tactically (or strategically since Hiroshima
and Nagasaki) because there is a tradition for their
non-use. Limited war depends upon the participants
recognizing the validity of several types of constraint,
for example, a border or an international law. "The
fundamental characteristic of any limit in a limited
war is the psychic, intellectual, or social characteristic
CQ
of being mutually recognized by both sides. . . .
And the
-^Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(Londons Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 257*
^ I b i d . , p. 260.
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non-use of TNF is a mutually recognized tacit bargain.
Schelling concludes by stating that the key to using
TNFs successfully within a theatre context is to be
found in eroding the distinction between a tactical
nuclear weapon and other conventional artillery. Once
there is a new tacit bargain between the superpowers
as to the role of TNFs in theatre conflicts, then such
conflicts need not have the high probability of escalation
to general nuclear exchange usually associated with
TNF use. "It is difficult to imagine that the tacit
agreement that nuclear weapons are different would be
as powerfully present on the occasion of the next limited
6o
war after they had already been used in one."
To speak of eroding the distinction betwen TNFs
and contemporary conventional weaponry is one thing.
However, to erode the distinction is another. This essay
referred earlier to the most significant problem in
volved in using a tactical nuclear weapon: How would
an opponent know that the nuclear weapon is being used
in a tactical and not in a strategic manner? How could
the Soviet Union be assured that the use of low-yield
nuclear weapons by NATO was not the first stage of a
massive pre-emptive strike? Indeed, would the size of
Ibid.. pp. 264-65.

the warhead be an issue? How about range, throw-weight,
and even the source of firing? Would tactical nuclear
weapons have to be launched *from Foward Based Systems
(contiguous to destination), ot could they be launched
from the sea, via submarine or cruiser? Schelling would
assert that there must be a "tacit agreement” or "bargain
on all of these problems. I suggest that there already is
The dichotomous classification of Potential Capability
and Real Capability is again useful.
In so far as Potential Capability (numbers and
types of.nuclear weapons) is concerned, the difference
between a strategic nuclear weapon and a tactical nuclear
weapon is clear enough. Research and Development on
these weapons make the distinction from the outset. Range
is one factor. Strategic weapons are those regarded as
intercontinental (intercontinental being defined as the
distance from the Soviet Union to the United States
for a ballistic missile to travel, and vice versa). The
range and land-based location of these missiles are
usually fixed and classified accordingly. For example,
it would be difficult for the Soviets to deploy a missile
with a range of 5000 miles on the East European border
and declare it a tactical nuclear weapon. Likewise, the
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United States would be hard put to justify the
deployment of the forthcoming MX missile in Western
Europe as a part of NATO's TNF. Thus, strategic weapons
are developed with an intercontinental mission in mind.
Their range, and usually their payload, are indicators
61
of this. On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons
are specifically tailored for theatre conflict. The
range of a tactical nuclear missile is seldom above
800-1000 miles. The payload varies, but does not seem
r- to reach the magaton level. Perhaps the greatest source
of definition is, however, Research and Development.
* -Both countries develop a nuclear weapons system with a
6?
mission, a purpose in store for that system.
61

Due to less accuracy m targeting, Soviet
^missiles carry a greater payload of explosive power.
Most Soviet strategic missiles carry warheads with
10-25 megatons (millions of tons equivalent TNT) of
power as contrasted with U.S. strategic missiles at
about 150-300 kiiotons (thousands of tons equivalent
TNT) of power. Tactical weapons vary accordingly.
62
There are a few weapons with dual capability
in the sense that they can serve both strategic and
tactical missions. The American cruise missile and
the Soviet Backfire bomber are good examples of this.
Both have ranges that can be extended with modification.
The Soviet Union and the United States, however,
attempt to minimize the difficulties involved in the
development of dual capable nuclear weapons by declaring
intent as to their potential and actual use. SALT is
a great stabilizer here. For example, SALT II limits
the range of cruise missiles (U.S.) launched from
land and air based systems, while curtailing production
of the Backfire bobmber and imposing a condition of
restraint in deploying the weapon strategically.
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Real Capability has been defined as the doctrinal
capability to employ nuclear weapons. It is a measure
of basically what percentage of weapons can be employed
(Potential Capability) will be employed in a given
military conflict situation. Real Capability, or the
doctrine of nuclear weapons use, has been a point of
ambiguity in calculations of possible escalation in
a theatre nuclear conflict. Consequently, many of the
criticisms of Tactical Nuclear Warfare have been directed
against Real Capability. If the United States employs
TNF in a.theatre conflict, how can the Soviet Union
be assured that the Real Capability utilized is tactical
and not strategic? That is, can either the Soviet Union
or the United States distinguish between TNF use as a
,theatre military tactic and TNF use as the first stage
of a pre-emptive strategic first-strike? The failure to
make such a distinction would more than likely result
in the much feared escalation to general nuclear exchange.
While many critics have argued against TNF use
because of the ambiguities involved in forming distinctions
between tactical and strategic nuclear force Real
Capability, there seem to be several mitigating factors
which encourage a quite different conclusion as to how
accurately an opponent can perceive the intent behind

nuclear weapons use. For one thing, TNF doctrines of
use are becoming more refined, along with the weapons
themselves which can be employed effectively to
accomplish the most limited of missions. The state
of advanced technology in the construction of tactical
nuclear weapons guarantees a very specific use,
commensurate with the demands of a local theatre war.
Perhaps the greatest impetus to the growing
distinction between Real Capability in strategic and
in tactical nuclear weapons has been the deployment of
TNFs in the European theatre for such a long time.
,
’The very presence of TNFs in Europe has guaranteed
and clarified their role as tactical weapons of war.
The United States is well aware that the Soviets have
deployed a great number of tactical nuclear weapons
within Warsaw Pact countries and are training their
forces for combat in a nuclear environment. There
would be little surprise in U.S. and NATO policy making
circles if the Soviet Union employed TNFs in theatre war.
And, given current NATO TNF Real Capability, there would
likewise be little surprise if NATO employed TNFs

in

a theatre war that they were losing. Thus, the very
presence of tactical nuclear weapons and the attention
recently paid to military doctrines of use by both
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NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have (1) eroded the
distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and con
ventional weaponry and, consequently, (2) emphasized
the disparate nature of tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons relative to one another.
This study does not attempt, however, to minimize
the risks involved in nuclear weapons use. They have
never been used before by two powers in war against
each other and there are necessarily a great number of
"ifs.". But this study has sought to introduce Tactical
Nuclear Warfare as a viable strategy for the United
States in theatre conflict with Soviet forces. It accepts
nuclear weapons as weapons of war, appraises their
military advantages and disadvantages, outlines the
development of both American and Soviet TNF doctrines of
use, and concludes by suggesting that the United States
would assume an inferior role in a theatre conflict
with Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces due to the lack of a
comparable TNF doctrine of use.
It is fair to say that by incorporating a firstuse strategy into U.S./NATO nuclear military posture,
the costs of conflict are heightened? that a first-use
strategy does not even allow for the possibility of a
conventional exchange. But given the present state of

Soviet TNF military doctrine for theatre conflict,
allowing for conventional war in a nuclear era may
itself result in unacceptable costs and escalation
to a more general stage of conflict.
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